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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper addresses the dynamic relationship between competition and bank stability 
in Albanian banking system during the period 2008 - 2015. To this purpose, we 
construct a proxy for bank competition as referred to the Boone indicator. We also 
calculated the Lerner index and the efficient adjusted Lerner index, as well as the profit 
elasticity index and the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index. The main results provide support 
for the “competition – stability” view – that lower degree of market power sets banks to 
less overall risk exposure. The results further show that increasing concentration will 
have a larger impact on bank’s fragility. Similar, bank stability is positively linked with 
macroeconomic conditions and capital ratio and inverse with operational efficiency. We 
also used a quadratic term of the competition measures to capture a possible non-linear 
relationship between competition and stability, but find no supportive evidence. 
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 The international process of banking liberalisation, triggered by excessive bank risk 
taking, has gone hand in hand with an increased occurrence of systemic banking crises, 
culminating in the GFC of 2007-2009 (Beck, et al., (2013). This has yet again 
heightened interest in the relationship between completion, market structure and 
financial stability. However, there is not yet a scientific consensus on whether bank 
competition mitigates or exacerbates financial stability as the predications emerging 
from the theoretical models and empirical studies are ambiguous and so far are also 
inconclusive (Kasman and Carvallo, 2014). The traditional view argues that fiercer 
competition among banks would give banks proper incentives to behave prudently and 
therefore lead to a more efficiency banking system, which benefits bank stability (Boyd 
and De Nicolo 2005, Beck et al., 2006, Schaeck et al., 2009 and Schaeck and Cihak 
2014). However, others have challenged this view, instead arguing that higher 
competition among banks reduces market power and profits margins, which essentially 
lowers the franchise value of banks. This as a result will encourage banks to take greater 
risks so as to make up the loss of declined franchise value, which may also lead to crisis 
(Keeley 1990, Allen and Gale 2004, Boyd, et al., 2006, Agorakia, et al., 2011, Leroy 
and Lucotte 2017). On top of these mainstream views, others argue that U-shaped 
relationship exists as lower degree of bank concentration may reduce the borrower’s 
probability of default (risk-shifting effect), but also the interest payments from 
performing loans, which serve as a buffer to cover loan losses (margin effects) 
(Martinez-Miera and Repullo 2010). 
 
This similarly inconclusive debate is particularly critical for Albania, as the Albanian 
financial system is currently centred on banks, where a large number of banks operate in 
a specific small opened economy, and equity market is remarkably underdeveloped. at 
the end of 2015, the ratio of financial system assets to GDP reached 99.2%, with the 
banking sector owning 91.4% of financial system assets (90.6% of GDP), while stock 
market capitalization is the lowest in South East Europe. On the one hand, development 
of the banking sector has been the main driving force behind economic prospect, while 
improving market and macroeconomic condition, as well as increasing competition has 
motivated larger foreign banks in more developed countries, most in the Eurozone, 
operating at relatively low margins to extend cross-border operations into potentially 
new and more profitable market such that in Albania. On the other hand, such patterns 
are also raising concerns about increased competition in the banking sector as it is often 
criticised for being “overbanked” and that bank stability may be triggered by excessive 
bank risk taking due to further competition, which may shift their focus towards 
increasing profits while ceasing to monitor and properly assess risk.  
 
The GFC did not affect the Albanian economy as strongly as its SEE neighbours. At the 
same time, banks showed an apparent resilience during this period and similarly they 
emerged from the GFC in a relatively stable position. Although, there are a number of 
challenges in the why banks are regulated and managed, while among other things the 
problems of banks being “too-big-too-fail has also emerged, especially in terms of 
market share as the 6 largest banks hold nearly 80% of the market. To that, still at a 
ratio of nearly 16.2% for the whole market and 22.2% for the systemic banks, 
the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) suggests that the banking sector is "moderately 
concentrated". Similarly, evidences (See also Graph 1 in Appendix A) show that there is 
a close linear relationship between the degree of market power and extend to which 
banks are exposure to greater instability, which suggests that competition foreheads 
bank fragility over time. Therefore the effect of the regulatory framework on 
competition and banks’ risk-taking incentives and ultimately bank stability make it a 
particularly interesting environment in which to study the competition-stability nexus. 
 
Against this background, the existing literature provides a fairly comprehensive review 
on competition-stability nexus, but of these cases still one question need to be answered 
empirically as there is no evidence on the nature of this relationship in the case of a 
small-opened emerging economy, namely Albania, and in particular after the GFC. The 
main question, therefore, addressed in this paper focuses on what is the effect of 
competition on banks stability after the GFC. The paper makes use of a sample with 
data for 16 banks operating in the Albanian financial sector over the period 2008 – 
2015. The empirical estimation approach follows a five-step procedure. First, we 
constructed a composite individual bank stability indicator as explained by Shijaku 
(2016a). Second, we calculate a competition indicator as suggested by Boone (2008). 
Then, empirical estimation is based on a dynamic two-step General Method of Moments 
(GMM) with unbalance panel with quarterly data for the period 2008 – 2015. Finally, 
we deepen our empirical analysis either by splitting the sample with regards to large and 
small banks or checking for non-linearity relationship between competition and stability 
in the case of Albanian banking sector. Finally, we use also other alternative measure of 
competition which includes the use Lerner index and the efficiency adjusted Lerner 
index, as well as the profit elasticity index and the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index. 
 
This paper complements and extends existing literature on this issue in several aspects. 
First, to the best of our knowledge this is the first study to investigate empirically 
competition-stability nexus focusing only on the period after the GFC, which may 
highlight the impact of the global turmoil on individual bank risk exposure. Second, 
since it focuses only on a single country, it avoids any pitfall as described by Uhde and 
Heimeshoff (2009) related to data issues and ensure comparability across both 
dependent and independent variables. Nor do we use data from the Bankscope database. 
Third, different from previous empirical work, this paper does neither focus on real 
episodes of banking crises nor use binary approach as a proxy for instability episodes. 
Neither it does use the Z-score or credit risk as an in-variant measure of the bank’s risk-
taking behaviour and distance to solvency, to which Fu, et al., (2014) provides some 
arguments against nor uses a Lerner index as an competitive proxy. As a first, approach 
we therefore gauge the relationship between the two by using instead a more 
sophisticated proxy for bank stability that is based on a wide set of consolidated balance 
sheet data and the principal component analyses approach as explained by Shijaku 
(2016a). Hence, our measurement of bank risk directly captures the possibility of 
outright bank defaults or/and stability conditions. This approach is advantageous even 
to the fact that it avoids any pitfalls of using the binary approach to crises episodes. At 
our best knowledge, no previous study has employed such bank stability indicator as the 
dependent variable to investigate the competition-bank stability nexus and we believe 
this is an important step forward toward a better understanding of the underlying 
mechanisms. On the one hand, we use an alternative competition indicator, as proposed 
by Boone (2008), which incorporates also the concept of efficiency structure based on 
bank behaviour. Finally, we provide appropriate evidence, by fragmentising this sector 
according to the size of the banks, addressing whether certain institutions show different 
concentration behaviour than others.  
 
By way of preview, we find reasonable evidence supporting the “competition-stability” 
view that greater competition increase bank stability. This implies that there is not 
trade-off for policymakers between competition and bank soundness in the banking 
sector in Albania. The robustness check tests also confirm our main findings that 
support the “completion-stability” view. The results further indicate that greater 
concentration has a negative impact on bank stability. At the same time, we do not find 
any evidence of a non-linear relationship in the competition – stability nexus. Nor do we 
find when we split the sample to account for small banks and large banks. To this 
approach, we find that this positive relationship is stronger for small banks rather the 
large banks. Finally, as for control variables, we find that macroeconomic conditions are 
relatively important for bank stability. Similarly, bank stability is also conditional to 
improving operation efficiency and capital structure of the banks. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarises the literature 
review. Section 3 presents the methodology with regards to model specification and 
data. The main results are presented in Section 4. The material concludes in section 5. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The impact of bank competition on financial stability remains a widely debated and 
controversial issue, both among policymakers and academics, long before the GFC 
started. Both at theoretical and empirical level, the issue remain still ambiguous and 
unresolved, despite a large body of literature (Kasman and Carvallo 2014). 
 
2.1. THEORETICAL LITERATURE 
 
From a theoretical perspective, there are two major streams with utterly opposite views. 
The competition-fragility view
2
 argues on a (negative) margin effect hypothesis 
assuming that a competition endangers bank stability. The idea is that increasing 
competition should erode banks’ net present value of profits to zero. Without potential 
                                                          
2 See among others Keeley (1990) Matutes and Vives (2000); Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000); Allen and Gale (2004); 
Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2006); Evrensel, (2008); Wagner (2010); and De Haan and Poghosyan, (2012). 
to make future profits (i.e. zero franchise value) banks would relax their investment 
selection requirements, which in return would give them an incentive to expand or/and 
take on new riskier policies, including high-risk and high yield investments, in an 
attempt to maintain the former level of profits. Conversely, the competition-stability 
view
3
 argues on a (positive) margin effect hypothesis. The ideas is that banks that have 
some market power (i.e. positive franchise value) tend to undertake some “credit 
rationing” and therefore might be more prudent in the aspect of risk-taking as they have 
‘something to lose’, which induce them adverse selection to risky investments (those 
that jeopardize future profits may not be accepted by banks authorities). Similarly, the 
considerable market power of only few banks would enhance profits through higher 
interest rate on loans [Boyd, et al., (2004)], which may provide banks with higher 
“capital buffer” to protect them from adverse external risks and moral hazard (risk 
shifting) with a negative impact on the stability of the banking system (Beck, et al. 
2006, Berger and Bouwman 2013, Fiordelisi and Mare 2014). Finally, different from 
the two mainstream views above, Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) modify the model 
in Body and De Nicolo (2005) assuming that U-shaped relationship exists. They show 
evidence that the probability of bank default first goes down, but then does up after a 
certain point as bank completion increase, which is also supported by findings of 
Berger, et. al, (2009), Jeona and Limb (2013), Jiménez, et. al., (2013), Liu, et. al., 
(2013), Samantas (2013).  
 
2.2. EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
 
In line with appropriate theoretical views, many recent studies have tried to analyse 
empirically the nexus between competition and stability in the banking system. Several 
works has tested the competition-stability nexus by focusing on competition indicators 
that are based on the structure-conduct-paradigm (Beck, et. al. 2006, Boyd, et. al. 2006, 
de Haan and Poghosyan 2012a, de Haan and Poghosyan 2012b, Mirzaei, et. al. 2012, 
Câpraru and Andrieş 2015, Fernández, et. al. 2016, Pawlowska 2016) and the relatively 
market-power hypothesis (Hesse and Čihák 2007, Levy Yeyati and Micco 2007, Uhde 
and Heimeshoff 2009, Wagner 2010, Fiordelisi and Mare 2014, Pawlowska 2016) and 
have found mixed evidence. For instance, Boyd and De Nicoló (2005) show that in a 
                                                          
3 See among others Boot, et al. (2000), Bond and De Nicolò (2005), Berger, et al. (2009); De Nicolò and Lucchetta (2009); 
Beck, et al. (2006); Berger and Bouwman (2013). 
concentrated market banks tend to be more risk-taking and an increase in concentration 
both in loan and deposit markets brings in higher loan rates charged to borrowers. Boyd, 
et. al. (2006) using a cross-sectional sample of about 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003 and a 
panel data set of about 2,600 banks in 134 non-industrialized countries for 1993-2004. 
Authors find that banks' probability of failure increases with market concentration, even 
though as Berger, et. al. (2009) suggests their conclusions are drawn using the 
concentrations, which might be insufficient measures of market structure. Bushman, et. 
al. (2016) using a new text-based measure of competition (which captures managers 
current perceptions of competitive pressures deriving from any and all sources, 
including potential entrants, non-bank competitors and labour markets) provide robust 
evidence that greater competition increase both individual bank risk and bank’s 
contribution to system-wide risk. Authors also show that higher competition is 
associated with lower underwriting standards, less timely loan loss recognition and a 
shift towards non-interest revenue. Leroy and Lucotte (2017) use the Z-score and 
systemic dimensions of risk and the Lerner index as in Ahamed and Mallick (2017) to 
analyse the relationship between competition and bank risk across a large sample of 
European listed banks over the period 2004–2013. Results suggest that competition 
encourages bank risk-taking and then increases individual bank fragility. Indeed, 
contrary to our previous results, the authors find that competition enhances financial 
stability by decreasing systemic risk. This result can be explained by the fact that weak 
competition tends to increase the correlation in the risk-taking behaviour of banks. 
Other papers that confirm the competition-fragility view include Beck, et al., (2013), 
Jiménez, et al., (2013), Soedarmonoa, et al., (2013), Fu, et al., (2014), Weiß, et al. 
(2014). 
 
By contrast, Beck, et. al. (2006) and De Nicolò, et. al. (2009) found that crises are less 
likely in economies with more concentrated banking systems. Another work by Schaeck 
et. al. (2009) uses the Panzar and Rosse H-Statistics, as an alternative measure of the 
degree of competitiveness for competition in 38 countries during 1980–2003 and 
concludes that more competitive banking systems are less prone to systemic crises and 
that time to crisis is longer in a competitive environment. Jiménez, et al., (2013) use a 
unique dataset for the Spanish banking system and report that standard measure of 
market concentration do not affect the NPL ratio, but found evidence in favour of the 
franchise value paradigm when using the Lerner indexes. Amidu and Wolfe (2013) 
investigates how the level of competition affects diversification and stability using a 
sample of 978 banks in 55 emerging and developing countries over the period 2000–
2007. The core finding is that competition increases stability as 
diversification across and within both interest and non-interest income generating 
activities of banks increases. Their analysis identifies revenue diversification as a 
channel through which competition affects bank insolvency risk in emerging countries. 
Other recent empirical papers that validate “competition-stability” view include 
Jiménez, at al., (2010), Nguyen, et al., (2012), Amidu, (2013), Jeona and Limb (2013), 
Schaeck and Cihak (2014). There are also other papers that validate both views. Berger, 
et. al. (2009) analyse empirically the link between credit risk (NPL ratio), bank stability 
(Z-index) and the capital ratio (capital ratio) and several measures of market power 
(Lerner and HHI), using bank level data from Bankscope on 8235 banks in 23 
developed countries. Their results suggest, consistent with the traditional “competition-
fragility” view, banks with a higher degree of market power also have less overall risk 
exposure. However, the data also provide some support for the one element of the 
competition-stability view – that market power does increase loan risk, which may be 
offset in part by higher capital rations. 
 
The above mention empirical papers produce cross-country evidence. A few studies 
focus on a single banking sector. For example Zhao, et. al. (2010) examine the degree to 
which deregulatory measure aimed at promoting competition lead to higher risk-taking 
in Indian banking system. The authors show evidence improved competition through 
deregulation does not lead to efficiency gains, but rather encourage further risk-taking. 
Fungacova and Weill (2013) analyse this issue based on a large sample of Russian 
banks over the period 2001-2007 and in line with the previous literature they also 
employ the Lerner index as the metric of bank competition. Results clearly support the 
view that tighter bank competition enhances the occurrence of bank failures. Kasman 
and Kasman (2015) analyse the relationship between competition (proxies by the 
efficiency-adjusted Lerner) and bank stability (proxies by Z-Score and NPL ratio) on 
Turkish banking system industry. The main results indicate that competition is 
negatively related to the NPL ratio, but positively related to the Z-Score. At the same 
time, only a few papers are loosely related to the research question we address in case of 
Albania. The most relevant work is by Dushku (2016)
4
 who investigates the link 
between completion (measured by Lerner Index) and bank risk-taking (measured by Z-
Score) for 15 banks operating in Albanian banking system during the period 2004 – 
2014. The author finds a positive link between competition and bank risk and show that 
the nexus between total (plus foreign) credit risk and competition is nonlinear.  
 
Similar to the theoretical debate, it is obviously that the biggest obstacle and the 
conclusions of the extant empirical research vary greatly and depend heavily on the 
indicators chosen for measuring the bank competition and the degree of risk as well as 
on the data used [Bushman, et. al. (2016)]. Therefore, one key challenge that explains 
the mixed results is related with the inappropriate measure to identify properly bank 
competition and bank stability [Pawlowska (2016)]. In terms of the bank risk measure, 
the available measure is even more limited, while the biggest concern is that most of 
them do not distinguish which aspect of risks they effectively approximate. For 
example, Carbó, et. al. (2009) found that existing indicators of competition (i.e. Lerner 
index, the H-Statistics) give different conclusions concerning the degree of competition 
as they tend to measure different things
5
.  
 
This paper complements and extends existing literature on this issue as it make use of 
superior indicators to measure the state of bank competition and banks stability. Most 
existing empirical studies investigating this relationship at the microeconomic level 
focus either on credit risk alone, using some form of credit risk measure such as non-
performing loans, or resort to bank risk measures constructed from balance sheet 
information, such as a Z-Score. In fact, while the Z-score can be interpreted as the 
number of standard deviations by which a bank is removed from insolvency, the non-
performing loans (NPL) ratio focuses on credit risk only. Hence, neither of them is a 
perfect substitute calculations to account for actual bank distress or the probability of 
default, which are without doubt the most appropriate concepts to define bank risk (Fu, 
                                                          
4 Note (2006) applies the Panzar-Rosse methodology to measure the competition degree in the Albanian banking system 
during the period 1999 - 2006. The author finds that Albanian banks operate in monopolistic competition conditions. 
5 See also Bikker, et. al. (2012). 
et al., 2014, Kick and Prieto 2015). One concern Beck, et al., (2013) in their empirical 
analysis is that Z-Score and Lerner both include profitability in the numerator and any 
positive relationship between the two might thus be mechanical rather than 
economically meaningful. To that, we neither focused on real episodes of banking crises 
nor use binary approach as a proxy for instability episodes, which both may either 
provide insufficient data for estimation purpose or be based on threshold level that are 
easily criticised. In fact, we extend empirical findings by including instead a more 
sophisticated proxy for bank stability that is based on a wide set of consolidated balance 
sheet data and the principal component analyses approach as explained by Shijaku 
(2016). At our best knowledge, no previous study has employed such bank stability 
indicator as the dependent variable to investigate the competition-bank stability nexus 
and we believe this is an important step forward toward a better understanding of the 
underlying mechanisms. On the one hand, we use a new measure of competition based 
on the reallocation of profits from inefficient banks to efficient ones as proposed by 
Boone, (2008), which has been used in recent studies (Van Leuvensteijn, et. al. 2011, 
Van Leuvensteijn, et. al. 2013, Kasman and Carvallo 2014, Schaeck and Čihák 2014, 
Duyguna, et. al. 2015, Kasman and Kasman 2015).  
 
3. METHODOLOGY APPROACH 
 
3.1. DEPENDANT VARIABLE 
 
The empirical literature provides a good description of how one might attempt to build a 
composite indicator of stability, but obviously this paper follows the Uniform Financial 
Rating System approach, introduced by the US regulation in 1979, referred to as 
CAELS rating (Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Earnings, Liquidity and Sensitivity to 
market risk (See Table 2 in Appendix)
6
. First, using the statistical methods, each 
indicator included in each of these categorises is normalised into a common scale with 
mean of zero and standard deviation of one
7
. The formula is given as: 
 
 
 
(3) 
 
                                                          
6 This approach is also used by International Monetary Fund Compilation Guide 2006 on Financial Soundness Indicators, but others authors e.g. 
Altman (1986), Sere-Ejembi, et. al., (2014) and Cleary and Hebb (2016). 
7 Normalizing the values avoids introducing aggregation distortions arising from differences in the means of the indicators. 
Where, Xt represents the value of indicators X during period t; μ is the mean and σ is the 
standard deviation. Second, all the normalised values of the set of correlated indicators 
used within one category is then converted into a single uncorrelated index by means of 
the statistical procedure, namely the principal component analysis (PCA) approach, 
which is yet again standardised through the procedure in Eq. (3). Then, the estimated 
sub-index are transformed between the values [0, 1] using exponential transformation [1 
/ (1 + exp(-Z*)]. Finally, the BSI is derived as a sum of the estimated exponential 
transformed sub-indexes, as follows: 
 
  
 
(4) 
 
   
 
(5) 
 
Where, n is the number of indicators in each sub-index; ‘C’ relates to the capital 
adequacy; ‘A’ represents a proxy to asset quality; ‘E’ represents a proxy to earnings; ‘L’ 
represents a proxy to liquidity efficiency categorises; and ‘S’ is related to the sensitivity 
of market risk. Z* is the exponential transformed simple average of the normalised 
values of each indicator included into the sub-index of the individual bank stability 
index. Then, the estimated index is a relatively measurement, where an increase in the 
value of the index at any particular dimension indicates a lower risk in this dimension 
for the period, compared with other periods. 
 
The advantage of this approach is fourfold. First, CAELS represents a useful 
“complement” to on-side examination, rather than a substitute for them [Betz, et. al., 
(2014)], and thereby creates an internal comprehensive monthly-based supervisory 
“thermometer” measurement to evaluate bank stability in real time and on an uniform 
basis and for identifying those institutions requiring special supervisory attention and 
concern with regards to both the present and future banking sector conditions. Second, 
as suggested by ECB (2007), it reflects more the Albanian financial structure by 
attaching more weight to banking sector as it is the most prominent agents in the 
financial markets, while it takes advantages of a broad range of bank level data. Third, 
the PCA approach highlights the most common factor identifying the patterns in the 
data without much loss of information, which at the same time solves for any problem 
of endogeneity mention above. Four, it does not take the probability form of the binary 
approach, which might expose it either to limitations of insufficient number of episodes 
or to the vulnerability of the methodology employed to calculate the threshold level, 
which might even provide falls banking distress signals. Rather it consists of a simpler 
approach that is easier to explain and implements and most importantly allows 
analysing the state of the bank as it develops and to that it is applicable for cross-section 
comparisons. Finally, the estimated index is a relatively measurement, where an 
increase in the value of the index at any particular dimension indicates a lower risk in 
this dimension for the period, compared with other periods. 
 
3.2. MEASURING COMPETITION: THE BOONE INDICATOR 
 
The literature review offers several methods to estimate competitive levels of a specific 
sector since this indicator cannot directly be measured. Some of them fall under the so-
called the Structural-Conduct-Performance (SCP) approach, which frequently includes 
measures of the market share and concentration ratio, numbers of banks or the 
Herfindhal-Hirschmann Index (HHI). The other methods are influenced by the New 
Empirical Industrial Organisation literature, which has been developed primarily from 
the non-structural models of Iwata (1974), Breshnahan (1982), Panzar and Rose (1987) 
and Lerner (1934) index or price-to-cost margin (PCM) approach
8
. In addition to these 
already popular measures, an alternative measure of competition as proposed first by 
Boone (2004) and further developed by Boone (2008) measures the impact of efficiency 
on performance in terms of profit. The idea of this profit-elasticity index, which also 
referred as the Boone indicator ( ), rests on the assumption that banks with superior 
efficiency, i.e. banks with lower cost, gain more benefits in terms of profit as a result of 
market share reallocation from less efficient banks to more efficient one and this effect 
becomes stronger in a highly competitive market structure. This means that in a more 
competitive market banks sacrifice more for being in a cost disadvantage position. Put 
differently, banks are punished more harshly in terms of profits for cost inefficiency. 
Therefore, the stronger this effect is the larger in absolute value  will be, which is also 
                                                          
8 The Lerner index has been widely used in recent research including Berger, et. al., (2009), Cipollini and Fiordelisi (2012); Fu, 
et al (2014). Dushku (2015) calculates it in the case of Albania by considering the difference between price and marginal cost 
as a percentage of prices. 
an indication of more competitive conditions in that particular market. In the empirical 
application, the simplest equation to identify the Boone indicator, for bank i at time t is 
defined as follows: 
 
 
 
(1) 
                                                                                                                                                                    
where  and  denotes the profit and the marginal cost for banks (proxy efficiency) of 
bank i at time t respectively;  is the bank fixed effect;  is a set of control variable 
associated with the coefficient ;  is the log-linearized transformation of the 
variables; and  is an idiosyncratic shock. The market equilibrium condition is E = 0. 
The E-statistic is , which gives the profit elasticity, that is, the percentage change 
in profits of bank i as a result of a percentage change in bank i’s costs. This indicator is 
in theory is expected to have a negative value, i.e. the increase in costs reduces profit, 
which can be interpreted as a reduction in the ability of the bank to affect its losses due 
to an increase in competition.  
 
Theoretically, efficient banks may choose to translate lower costs either into higher 
profits or into lower output prices in order to gain market share. As a consequence, 
using this measure for analysing competition in the banking sector, some researcher
9
 
transform the formula of Boone indicator and replace the value of profit with a bank 
market share, as follows: 
 
 
 
(2) 
 
Where,  is the market share of bank i at time t. In addition, as in the case of the 
Lerner index, Boone indicator require in its calculation an estimation of the marginal 
costs, which, based on Fiordelisi and Mare (2014) and Dushku (2015), is estimated 
through the trans-log cost function (TCF), as follows: 
 
 
(3) 
                                                          
9 Van Leuvensteijn, et. al., (2011), Tabak, et. al., (2012), Van Leuvensteijn, et. al., (2013). 
 
 
 
 
Where,  is the total costs of bank i at time t,  is bank output,  is a vector of input 
prices, namely labour price ( ), price of borrowed funds ( ) and capital price ( ), 
 is a time trend capturing the dynamics of the cost-function (efficiency) over 
time,  is a dummy variable to account for the effect of the global financial crises, 
which takes a value of 1 during the GFC and 0 otherwise, and , , ,  and  are 
coeeficients to be estimated.  is a two-component error term computed as follows: 
 
  (4) 
 
Where,  is a two-side error term, and  is a one-sided distribance term representing 
inefficiency. Then, from Equation (3), assuming that inputs’ prices are homogeneous, 
the marginal cost can be derived as follows: 
 
 
 
(5) 
 
The cost function must be homogenous of degree one in input prices which imposes 
some restrictions on the parameter estimates. Linear homogeneity means that the 
percentage increase in all the three input prices raises the value of the cost by that same 
proportion. This property implies that the value of the three inputs included in the cost 
function represent the total cost. The linear homogeneity in input prices property 
requires the following restrictions on the parameter estimates to hold: 
 
 
 
 
(6.1) 
 
 
 
(6.2) 
 
 
(6.3) 
 For the research purpose we estimate Boone indicator, using both Equation (1) and 
Equation (2). However, the former is operationally impossible due to the negative net 
income generated by some of the banks operating in the Albanian banking system in 
2008-2010. To overcome this problem the value of the bank profit is replaced by the 
volume of net interest profit. Then, Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) are often run by using the 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) approach with random effects.  
 
3.3. THE EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
 
The empirical model specification draws on the extensive review of previous studies, 
but it also departs from Shijaku (2016a) and Shijaku (2016b) to consider the link 
between competition and bank stability instead of market power or concentration. The 
model is specified as follows:  
 
  (7) 
 
Where,  is a stability indicator of bank i at time t, with i = 1, ..., N and t = 1, ..., 
T. α is a constant term.  is a vector of explanatory variables grouped into three main 
categories: (1)  is a set of bank-specific explanatory variables, namely 
operational efficiency and leverage ratio;  is an industry explanatory variable 
that proxy by the Lerner index;  is a set of control variables that 
account for state of economy, which consists of two variables such as output and 
primary sovereignty risk; β is a vector of coefficients to be estimated.  is an error 
terms that is assumed to be identically and independently distributed with mean of 0 and 
variance .  
 
The model is estimated follows strictly the approach as in Shijaku (2016) through 
means a dynamic General Method of Moments (GMM) weights differences (AB-1-step) 
as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover, (1995), while we 
use all the past information of  up to 4 lags as instruments variable. Then, the 
Haussmann test is used for over-identifying restrictions based on the sample analogy of 
the moment conditions adapted in the estimation process, thereby as to determine the 
validity of the instrument variables (i.e. tests of the lack of serial correlation and 
consistency of instruments variables).  
 
3.4. DATA 
 
The sample data for this study consists of quarterly data gathered and complied by the 
Bank of Albania, which is taken from balance sheet and income statement items of 16 
banks operating in Albania. The strength of the dataset is its sample coverage and 
reliability of information. It covers all banks operating in Albania in the last two decade. 
The sample consists of 960 quarterly data for 16 banks operating in Albania, since 2001 
Q01.  
 
The variables used to calculate the competition indicator as a follow. TC is the sum of 
personnel expenses, other administrative expenses and other operating expenses. The 
bank’s single output, Q, is proxy by bank total assets.  is calculated as the ratio of 
personnel expenses over total assets.  is the ratio of other administrative expenses plus 
other operating expenses over total fixed assets.  is the ratio of interest expenditure 
over the sum of total deposits.  takes the value of 1 during the period 2008 Q03 
– 2010 Q04, and 0 otherwise. All variables are log-linearized, besides the CRISIS. 
 
The empirical study focuses on the period 2008 Q02 – 2015 Q03. That includes a total 
panel balanced observations with 448 observations and 28 periods. The variables used 
for empirical analysis are approximated as follows. CAELS is transformed into an index, 
taking as the base year the average performance during the year 2010. It is a relatively 
measurement, where an increase in the value of the index at any particular dimension 
indicates a lower risk in this dimension for the period, compared with other periods. 
EFFICIENCY is proxy as gross expenditure to gross income ratio. LEVERAGE presents 
the logarithm of the equity to asset ratio of individual banks. BOONE is a non-structural 
competition index variable as explained above. It is transformed also into an index, taking as the 
base year the average performance during the year 2010 and enters the model as log-
transformed. The macroeconomic variables are aggregated indicators that represent the 
state of the economy. GDP represents the gross domestic production. It is transformed 
in real terms by deflated with the Consumer Price Index. PSRISK represents the spread 
between domestic 12 months T-Bills and the German 12 months T-Bills. They are 
transformed in real terms by subtracting the respective domestic and German annual 
inflation rate. All the data represent the end-period values. They are log-transformed, 
besides the PSRISK. The bank-specific variables and the stability indicator are estimated 
individually for each bank. 
 
Further, the dataset developed for this paper has several sources. Data on GDP are taken 
from the Albanian Institute of Statistics. Data on the domestic T-Bills rate are taken 
from the Ministry of Finance. Data on German 12 months T-Bills rate and German 
Consumer Price Index are taken from Bloomberg. The rest of the data are taken from 
Bank of Albania.  
 
Finally, prior to the empirical estimation, all the data have been subject to a unit root 
test procedure on the argument to understand their properties and also to be sure that 
their order of integration fulfils the criteria for our empirical estimation approach. The 
latter is a pre-required condition in order to receive consistent and unbiased results. 
Therefore, the unit root test approach includes the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and 
the Phillips-Peron (PP) Fisher Chi-square tests. The reason is twofold. First, these tests 
are built on the same null hypothesis that panel variable are stationary. Second, they are 
mostly used for unbalanced panel model, as it is our sample. Results are presented in 
Table 2 in Appendix. Findings imply that some of variables included in our specified 
model are integrated of order zero I(0). This means that they are stationary. Therefore, 
they enter the model in level. This set of variables includes EFFICIENCY and 
LEVERAGE. The other variables, namely CAELS, GDP, PSRISK and BOONE are found 
to be integrated of order one, I(1). This means they pose non-stationary properties. 
Therefore, they enter the model as first difference, since it will transform them into a 
stationary stance
10
. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1. MAIN RESULTS 
 
                                                          
10 These results are robustness also to other unit root test approaches, including the Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat test and Fisher 
test. Data can be provided upon request. 
This section reports the results from the model as specified in in Eq. [7], which are 
reported in Table 3, in Appendix. We estimate 5 regressions. In each regression we use 
the same measure of competition, but to some methodological changes. First, column 
[1] reports the results of a linear relationship between competition and stability 
including all banks operating in Albania. Second, column [2] presents the results with 
regards to a possible non-linearity relationship. Then, the other columns report results 
with regards to alternative sample. Therefore, column [3] and column [4] show the 
results as presented previously, but with regards to a sample consisting of large banks. 
Similarly, column [5] and [6] provide results with regards to small banks. All models 
are estimated through the GMM approach. At the bottom of the table, we report the 
specification test results for the GMM estimation
11
. The results show that the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected. According to this test, all GMM equations are properly 
specified. 
 
We first analyse the results of estimated parameter with regards to the external and 
internal variables. The results indicate that all the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables have the expected signs. They accomplish also previous studies as reported by 
Shijaku (2016a) and (2016b). First, macroeconomic conditions are found to be 
relatively crucial factors for bank stability. The coefficient of GDP is positive in all 
regressions, suggesting that increases in economic growth have a positive effect on bank 
stability. This effect is found to be relatively stronger for small banks. One possible 
explanatory for this is that small banks in Albania are more exposed to individuals and 
small and medium enterprises, which in respond might be affected more by economic 
turmoil. The coefficient of primary sovereignty risk, presented by PSRISK, is significant 
negative in all the regressions, besides for small banks, suggesting that a higher spread 
ratio decreases bank stability. Evidences show, however, that the effect is stronger for 
large banks. This might be explained also by the fact that this group of banks is the 
main one that supports the domestic government borrowing and hold the main stock of 
bank lending to the private sector. On the other hand, at the given magnitude of the 
coefficients suggests that the interest rate pass-through effect on bank stability is found 
                                                          
11 Haussmann test indicates whether the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. The GMM does not require 
distributional assumptions on the error term and it is more efficient that the Two Least Two Square approach as it accounts for 
heteroskedasticity Hall (2005). 
to be relatively low. Second, bank specific factors are also found to impact bank 
stability. The coefficients of both EFFICIENCY and LEVERAGE are statistically 
significant. The magnitude of the coefficients indicates that there is a trade-off between 
operational efficiency and capital in terms of bank stability. The former has a positive 
sign suggesting that operational efficiency and capital structure have an impact on bank 
stability. This suggests that bank stability increases through improving operational 
efficiency and a better capital structure. By contrast, we found that capital is relatively 
more important for small banks compared to the higher effect of operational efficiency 
found for large banks.  
 
Table 3 also summarises the regressions results when taking the Boone indicator as the 
measure of competition. As mentioned before, it emphasizes the effect of an increase in 
marginal cost on the decrease in market shares. The results indicate that the coefficient 
of Boone indicator is significantly positive, suggesting that competition increases bank 
stability, given that higher value of the Boone indicator signify a higher degree of 
competition. At the same time, since Boone indicator is significant, change of marginal 
cost has more effects on profits, which means the market share is subject to more 
competition. Similarly, as competition in the banking sector increases it is likely to 
boost the franchise value of firms and encourage banks to lower their overall risk 
exposure, thus confirming the competition-stability view in the case of Albania. This 
fining is consistent with the “competition-stability view” of other recent studies (Berger 
and Bouwman 2013, Fiordelisi and Mare 2014, Schaeck and Cihak 2014) that greater 
bank competition is associated with higher bank stability.  
 
Finally, for a robustness test following Jimenez, et al., (2013, Liu, et al. (2013), Fu, et 
al., (2014), Kasman and Kasman (2015), we used also a quadratic term of the measures 
of competition to capture a possible non-linear relationship between competition and 
bank stability. Results as reported in Table 3, column [2] in Appendix reveal an 
important consideration that is that we did not find evidence of non-linearity 
relationship between competition and stability in the case of Albanian banking system, 
thus rejecting Martinez-Miera and Reputto (2010) model. Nor did we find when we 
spitted the sample with regards to small and large banks as reported in Table 2, column 
[4] and column [6] in appendix]
12
. Furthermore, as our measures for competition mainly 
focus on the lending market, it should be kept in mind that this conclusion is quite 
subject to loan markets. 
 
4.2. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
In an attempt to further enrich our analysis and as a complementary proof we run a 
number of robustness checks on our main model, as specified in Equation (7), but this 
time we use five different alternative measures as proxy for bank competition, and 
which are used also as explanatory variables to get more robust results. The robustness 
checks are generally robust with the findings of the previous sections as Table 4 in 
Appendix A reports our main results
13
. Firstly, column [1] shows the impact of 
competition, as measured by an alternative Boone indicator that includes also bank 
capital (Equity) in the estimation of the TCF model, on bank stability [See also 
Equation (B.1 and B.2) in Appendix B]. Our main results are maintained as in the 
previous sections re-confirming that competition boost bank stability. 
 
Secondly, as a robustness check, we also used the estimates of marginal cost from 
Equation (5) to calculate the Lerner index [LERNER]
14
 and the efficiency adjusted 
Lerner index [LERNER*]
15
, as well as to estimate the profit elasticity 
[PROFITELASTICITY]
16
, the results of which are respectively reported in column [2], 
[3] and [4]. The results show that the LERNER and the efficiency adjusted Lerner are 
significantly negatively related to CAELS. As mention previously since the Lerner index 
is inversely proportional to bank stability and thus it appears that the negative sign for 
both these competition measures show that increases in the degree of bank pricing 
power are positively related to individual bank stability in Albanian banking sector. By 
contrast, the coefficient of PROFITELASTICITY exhibit a positive sign, suggesting that 
lower elasticity of profit would boost bank stability. These results provide yet again 
                                                          
12 We used also a cubic term of the measures of competition to capture a possible non-linear relationship between competition 
and bank stability, bust still found no supportive evidence. Results are provided upon request. 
13 Results are also robust to methodological changes to which we used the GMM White Period 2nd Step approach. The Arellano 
and Bond test results also require significant AR(1) serial correlation and lack of AR(2) serial correlation (See also Kasman and 
Kasman, 2015). 
14 Following Fiordelisi and Mare (2014) we calculated the Lerner index as . The index is a linear straight 
forward indicator that takes the value between 0 and 1, with lower value indicating greater degree of competition. 
15 [See also Equations (B.3) in Appendix B for the approach used to estimate this index]. 
16
 [See also Equations (B.4) in Appendix B for the approach used to estimate this index]. 
other strong supportive evidences for the competition-stability view, which can apply to 
the Turkish banking industry.  
Finally, we also examine the impact of bank concentration on the stability of Albanian 
banks using the Herfindahl index (also known as Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, 
or HHI)
17
. The results are reported in Table 4, Column (5) in Appendix A. The negative 
coefficient for the HHI indicator supports a negative link between market power and 
bank stability. This suggests that lower bank concentration ratio leads to a decrease in 
bank insolvency risk, and therefore a higher degree of bank stability. That is that the 
less concentrated the banking system is the more stable banks are. By conctrast, we find 
that the impact of bank concentration is relatively higher that extend to which 
competition effects bank stability. 
 
On the one hand, it is very clear that the results remain as those analysed in the previous 
sections as in all the regressions, we find that bank market power is negatively related to 
bank stability, meaning that there is a positive relationship between higher degree of 
competition and stability. These results support both theories of competition-stability 
view and concentration-fragility view in the case of Albania showing that banks under 
less degree of market power are, on average, more stable. On the other hand, it could be 
treated as a robustness check of the results which further strengths our conclusions in 
terms of competitions. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The developments in the banking market leading to the financial crisis in 2008 have 
once again heightened interest in the determinants of bank risk. An increasingly 
competitive environment caused by the growing internationalization of financial 
markets and the emergence of non-bank players in the market for corporate financing 
has often been seen as contributing to increasing banks’ incentives to take risks. This 
perception of the effects of higher competition on bank risk is confirmed by a large 
array of theoretical and empirical banking models.  
 
                                                          
17 The HHIA is calculated using bank total asset as inputs ( , where s represents the market share of each bank 
in total assets in the market). It can range from 0 to 1.0, moving from a huge number of very small firms to a 
single monopolistic producer. Increases of the index generally indicate a decrease in competition and an increase of market 
power, and vice versa. 
This paper continues the series of studies performed with the sample data of the 
Albanian banking sector. It has the purpose to fill in the information gap of analysing 
whether competition improves or reduces banking stability for banks operating in 
Albanian banking system during the period 2008 – 2015. Although there have been 
several articles we improve on the existing literature along three crucial dimensions. 
First, in contrast to other bank-level studies, we use the most direct measure of bank 
stability available, which is generated from the unique supervisory dataset collected by 
the Bank of Albania to which we analyse the bank competition-stability nexus. Second, 
we deepen our empirical analysis either by splitting the sample with regards to large and 
small banks. Finally, we also check for non-linearity relationship between competition 
and stability in the case of Albanian banking sector.  
 
In summary, the main result of this paper is that competition increases bank stability 
and results appear to hold for a wide array of other alternative model specifications, 
estimation approaches and variable construction. Besides this major finding, we also 
found that concentration is inversely correlated to bank stability suggesting that a more 
concentrated banking system is more vulnerable to systemic instability. The overall 
results suggest that higher pricing power and less concentration could simultaneously 
lead to higher bank stability, thus bolstering the competition-stability view suggesting 
that bank competition and bank soundness go hand in hand with each other. Similar, 
under a concentration-stability view, a greater bank concentration easies market power, 
which increases profit margins, and results in higher franchise value. At the same time, 
we found no evidence of non-linearity relationship between competition and stability in 
the case of Albanian banking system. Furthermore, an interesting point is that we find 
that the relationship between bank competition and bank stability is stronger for small 
banks rather than large banks. Similarly, we did not find any non-linearity relationship 
between competition and bank stability in the case of small banks. Nor do we find for 
large banks.  Finally, as for control variables, results reconfirm previous studies in the 
case of Albanian banking sector. First, macroeconomic conditions are relatively 
important for bank stability. Similarly, bank stability is also conditional to improving 
operation efficiency and capital structure of the banks. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
Graph 1. Bank competition and bank stability, 2008 -2015. 
 
 
 
Source: Bank of Albania, Author’s calculations 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Panel Unit Root Test. 
Variable 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square PP - Fisher Chi-square 
Intercept 
Intercept 
and 
Trend 
None Intercept 
Intercept 
and 
Trend 
None 
ΔCAELS [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0018] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
ΔGDP [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [1.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
ΔPSRISK [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [1.0000] [0.0000] 
ΔBOONE [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [1.0000] [0.0000] 
EFFICIENCY [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.9649] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.8965] 
LEVERAGE [0.0000[ [0.0007] [0.0001] [0.0000] [0.0006] [0.0010] 
Note: Δ is a first difference operator. Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square 
distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2. Correlation Analysis: Ordinary. 
Sample: 2008Q2 2015Q3 
Included observations: 480 
Balanced sample (listwise missing value deletion) 
 
CAELS GDP PSRISK BOONE EFFICIENCY LEVERAGE 
CAELS 1 0.103 -0.070 0.047 -0.103 0.012 
GDP 0.103 1 -0.016 0.061 -0.036 0.007 
PSRISK -0.070 -0.016 1 -0.039 -0.031 0.045 
BOONE 0.047 0.061 -0.039 1 -0.068 -0.005 
EFFICIENCY -0.103 -0.036 -0.031 -0.068 1 0.366 
LEVERAGE 0.012 0.007 0.045 -0.005 0.366 1 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 
 
Table 3. Empirical Results through means of GMM approach. 
Model Estimation 
Banking System Large Banks Small Banks 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
ΔGDP 
0.9449 0.9494 0.3924 0.3632 1.1628 0.8821 
[0.03] [0.05] [0.32] [0.41] [0.04] [0.09] 
ΔPSRISK 
-0.0549 -0.0549 -0.0574 -0.0572 -0.0522 -0.0611 
[0.06] [0.05] [0.07] [0.07] [0.12] [0.27] 
ΔBOONE 
0.2037 0.1996 0.0415 0.0488 0.2987 0.8184 
[0.03] [0.19] [0.27] [0.15] [0.21] [0.04] 
ΔBOONE^2 
 -0.0313  0.0677  13.70 
 [0.96]  [0.72]  [0.25] 
EFFICIENCY 
-0.4119 -0.4118 -0.3976 -0.3910 -0.3201 -0.250 
[0.08] [0.08] [0.13] [0.14] [0.23] [0.33] 
LEVERAGE 
0.5661 0.5674 0.0637 0.0514 0.3762 0.4989 
[0.02] [0.02] [0.68] [0.75] [0.04] [0.03] 
CRISIS 
  -0.0687 -0.0679 0.0290 0.040 
  [0.35] [0.36] [0.67] [0.67] 
Cross-sections 16 16 6 6 10 10 
Instrument rank 20 20 20 20 20 20 
No. of observations:  448 448 162 162 270 270 
J-statistic 18.4 18.3 13.2 13.1 18.7 12.2 
Probability (J-statistic) 0.24 0.19 0.51 0.44 0.17 0.51 
Table shows bank-level GMM regressions statistics on the empirical results. Haussmann tests (J-Statistics and the Probability of J-
Statistics) investigates the validity of the instruments used, and rejection of the null-hypothesis implies that instruments are valid as 
they are not correlated with the error term. The Probability appears in parentheses [ ] below estimated coefficients. 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 4. Empirical Results through means of GMM approach. 
Model Estimation 
Banking System 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
ΔGDP 
0.9805 1.0282 1.0895 0.8313 1.2343 
[0.026] [0.019] [0.028] [0.000] [0.02] 
ΔPSRISK 
-0.0548 -0.0267 -0.0451 -0.0348 -0.0267 
[0.059] [0.057] [0.197] [0.000] [0.08] 
ΔBOONE* 
0.0679     
[0.100]     
LERNER 
 -0.0694    
 [0.797]    
LERNER* 
  -0.0337   
  [0.651]   
PROFITELASTICITY 
   0.0407  
   [0.472]  
HHI 
    -0.8172 
    [0.25] 
EFFICIENCY 
-0.4065 -0.3540 -0.4444 -0.5050 -0.4173 
[0.097] [0.188] [0.079] [0.000] [0.09] 
LEVERAGE 
0.5324 0.3656 0.6289 0.0613 0.6238 
[0.026] [0.232] [0.010] [0.527] [0.02] 
Cross-sections 16 16 16 16 16 
Instrument rank 20 20 20 20 20 
J-statistic 17.6 18.4 15.8 12.0 18.5 
Probability of J-statistic 0.28 0.19 0.33 0.29 0.19 
No. of observations:  448 493 434 480 480 
Table shows bank-level GMM regressions statistics on the empirical results of the estimations using alternative 
measures of bank competition. Haussmann tests (J-Statistics and the Probability of J-Statistics) investigates the 
validity of the instruments used, and rejection of the null-hypothesis implies that instruments are valid as they are not 
correlated with the error term. The Probability appears in parentheses [ ] below estimated coefficients. 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 5. Empirical Results through means of GMM approach. 
Model Estimation 
Banking System 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
ΔGDP 
0.8169 0.5475 0.7000 0.7092 0.9319 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
ΔPSRISK 
-0.0534 -0.0301 -0.0312 -0.0543 -0.0279 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
ΔBOONE* 
0.0581     
[0.00]     
LERNER 
 -0.2042    
 [0.08]    
LERNER* 
  -0.0312   
  [0.09]   
PROFITELASTICITY 
   0.0304  
   [0.42]  
HHI 
    -0.9244 
    [0.00] 
EFFICIENCY 
-0.2962 -0.1351 -0.3839 -0.2946 -0.2252 
[0.07] [0.16] [0.00] [0.05] [0.09] 
LEVERAGE 
0.3114 0.2042 0.4864 0.0522 0.4215 
[0.06] [0.09] [0.00] [0.63] [0.00] 
Cross-sections 16 16 16 16 16 
Instrument rank 20 20 20 20 20 
No. of observations:  480 480 480 480 480 
J-statistic 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 
Probability of J-statistic 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 
AR(1) [p-value] 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.59 
AR(2) [p-value] 0.45 0.11 0.14 0.21 0.53 
Table shows bank-level GMM regressions statistics on the empirical results of the estimations using alternative the 
White Period 2nd Step Approach. Haussmann tests (J-Statistics and the Probability of J-Statistics) investigates the 
validity of the instruments used, and rejection of the null-hypothesis implies that instruments are valid as they are not 
correlated with the error term. The Arellano and Bond test results also require significant AR(1) serial correlation and 
lack of AR(2) serial correlation (See also Kasman and Kasman, 2015). The Probability appears in parentheses [ ] 
below estimated coefficients. 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
As a robustness test, we estimate an alternative measure of the marginal cost in the Boone 
indictor formula
18
 following Leon (2014) and re-specify Equation (3) to include also additional 
control variable, namely bank capital. The specified model is expressed as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
+  
(B.1) 
 
Where,  is total equity of bank i at time t. This model is estimated through the OLS approach. 
Then, assuming that inputs’ prices are still homogeneous, Equation (4) is re-expressed as 
follows:  
 
 
 
(B.2) 
 
The most important findings, as reported in Table 5 in Appendix, is that the correlation between 
marginal costs calculated based on different approach have a relatively high level of correlation, 
which is also statistically significant. This means that changing methodology and augmenting 
the TCF model does not change the results and that banking sector in Albania exhibits 
competitive patterns.  
 
Following Clerides, et al. (2015) and Kasman and Kasman (2015) we estimated the efficiency 
adjusted Lerner index at the bank level, as follows:  
 
 
 
(B.3) 
 
Where,  is the profit of bank i at time t, and other are as previously defined. Similar 
to the conventional Lerner index, the Adjusted Lerner index also ranges from 0 to 1, 
with larger values implying greater market power. Then, Clerides, et al. (2015) measure 
the profit elasticity by deriving from the efficiency adjusted Lerner index by solving for  
in equation (B.3) and differentiating with respect to , as follows: 
 
 
 
(B.4) 
 
Hence, the efficiency adjusted Lerner index and the profit elasticity are two closely related 
concepts. 
                                                          
18 The results are provided upon request. 
